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Prior research has paid very little attention, if at all, to the risks and costs entailed in IT 
disintegration processes. In this study, we begin addressing this gap by studying how IT 
disintegration challenges posed by corporate divestitures affect the regulatory compliance risks 
and costs of divesting firms in the context of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). We 
hypothesize that firms with higher corporate divestiture intensities are more likely to have 
material weaknesses in their IT controls, more likely to become incompliant with SOX, and more 
likely to incur higher auditor fees during SOX audits. We also hypothesize that superior IT 
capabilities could reduce the probability and magnitude of the regulatory compliance risks and 
costs during divestitures. We find empirical support for these hypotheses in a sample of 252 
publicly traded U.S firms that were audited independently for SOX compliance between 2004 and 
2008. 
Keywords:  IT disintegration, corporate divestitures, IT control effectiveness, Sarbanes-Oxley 
compliance, auditor fee, IT capability 
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Introduction 
Integrating IT systems and processes within and across firm boundaries is an important task of IT functions of 
corporations (Barki and Pinsonneault 2005). IT integration enhances connectivity, communication, collaboration, 
and coordination within and across firm boundaries, and generates synergy and performance benefits. IS research 
recognizes the importance of IT integration and studies its antecedents and consequences in strategic initiatives of 
firms such as corporate diversification (Tanriverdi 2005), mergers and acquisitions (Mehta and Hirschheim 2007), 
strategic partnerships and inter-firm relationships (Kim and Mahoney 2006; Malhotra et al. 2007; Rai et al. 2006; 
Saraf et al. 2007), and outsourcing and offshoring (Lee et al. 2004; Tanriverdi et al. 2007). A phenomenon that has 
not received much research attention is that firms not only need IT integration, but, on a selective basis, they also 
need IT disintegration (Markus 2000). Selling-off a business unit, changing strategic alliance partners, bringing back 
in-house previously outsourced or offshored IT or business operations, or internally reconfiguring relationships 
among business units are examples of business decisions that require the IT function to engage in disintegration of 
some of the previously integrated IT systems and processes. As Lynne Markus (2000) suggests, “[t]oday, 
management philosophy emphasizes business disintegration as much as (or more than) it does business 
integration.” While IS research has studied IT integration extensively, it has paid very little attention to IT 
disintegration (Markus 2000; Markus 2001). In this research, we begin addressing this gap by studying some of the 
risks and costs associated with IT disintegration requirements of corporate divestitures. 
IT disintegration during corporate divestitures entails notorious IT challenges. During divestiture, one firm sells-off 
one of its business units to another firm as an individual operating unit (Decker and Mellewigt 2007). In their daily 
operations, companies are pursuing IT integration for cross-unit integration, coordination, and synergy creation 
(Tanriverdi 2006). However, the dominant system integration paradigm tends to tightly couple IT resources through 
ad hoc middleware or monolithic software packages such as ERP (Rettig 2007). Such integration approaches raise 
barriers to disintegration of IT resources during divestitures. As Markus argues: “[w]hat happens when companies 
are divested or spun off? Huge efforts are often required to disconnect their operations from those of parent 
companies…Today's systems integration paradigm does not afford this capability” (Markus 2001). Not surprisingly, 
Booz Allen Hamilton (2002) lists IT disintegration as one of the top challenges in corporate divestitures. AT 
Kearney (2004) reinforces this observation by stating, “In nearly all of our divestiture projects, information 
technology has been the most complex and difficult area to separate, and the time required for separation has 
always been underestimated.” Deloitte Consulting (2009) attributes the IT disintegration challenges to the IT 
integration wave fueled by ERP implementations: “[a]s a result of the trend toward tightly-integrated businesses 
largely driven by ERP implementations over the past 20 years, carving out and divesting business units have 
become more complex…significantly more planning and resources are required to create a stand-alone business 
unit.” Divestiture performance could be significantly weakened if the seller underestimates the costs of IT 
disintegration. For example, when selling its vitamins division, Roche underestimated the IT disintegration costs by 
a factor of 20 (Applegate et al. 2007).  
IT disintegration challenges during divestitures can disrupt existing IT controls and increase IT risks. For example, 
divesting firm needs to terminate access to IT systems of all employees leaving with the divested unit. Such bulk 
access de-provisioning is difficult to complete in a short period. Many orphaned accounts can remain hanging 
around in the IT systems after the divestiture, and increase the vulnerability of the IT systems to unauthorized access. 
A recent survey shows that “10% of terminated individuals sampled were found to have active access on at least 1 
key financial system. Half of those were found to also have an active VPN account” (Sailpoint 2009). Divestitures 
can also potentially increase other IT risks such as (1) IT competence erosion due to loss of accumulated IT 
knowledge or capable IT employees, (2) infrastructure risk due to security and access vulnerabilities, (3) IT project 
risks due to change in ownership and subsequent changes in controller-controlee relationships, (4) business 
continuity risks due to disruption of operations during the separation of previously integrated systems and processes, 
and (5) information risks such as the loss of protection of data privacy and intellectual property due to disruption of 
related controls during the change management processes of divestitures (Parent and Reich 2009).  
In this study, we examine how IT disintegration challenges faced in corporate divestitures affect regulatory 
compliance risks and costs of divesting firms in the context of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the U.S. SOX 
provides an appropriate empirical context for this study because section 404 of the Act (SOX-404) requires 
management of publicly traded U.S. firms to disclose an assessment of the state of the firm’s internal controls over 
financial reporting. It also requires independent auditors of the public firms to attest to the managements’ 
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assessments of internal controls. Controls over IT activities and IT-enabled automated process controls are integral 
parts of this assessment (ITGI 2006). Thus, with the passage of the Act in 2002, IT control effectiveness assumed 
top priority in the agendas of CEOs, CFOs, and CIOs in large publicly traded firms. An IT executive reported, “SOX 
forced a major reprioritization of everything from top to bottom” (Parry 2004). Another IT executive reported that 
he had to spend about 35% of his time getting ready for the SOX compliance deadline. It is important for firms to 
prevent material weaknesses in their IT-based and non-IT internal controls for several reasons. First, capital markets 
negatively react to disclosures of internal control material weaknesses (ICMW) (Beneish et al. 2008; Hammersley et 
al. 2008). Second, ICMW adds noise to accounting information and leads to unintentional accounting treatment 
errors such as inaccurate accruals (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008). Third, ICMW increases audit fees charged by the 
external auditors (Raghunandan and Rama 2006). Fourth, ICMW could increase firm’s risk of being de-listed from 
the stock exchange by regulators, and the CEOs and CFOs of publicly traded firms face the risk of being fined up to 
$5million and being jailed for up to 20 years under certain circumstance. Thus, firms have invested significantly in 
IT and non-IT internal controls to become compliant with SOX-404 for the first time. But, SOX compliance is not a 
one-time event. It is an ongoing process since firms are required to maintain their compliance with SOX every year. 
Corporate restructuring activities such as divestitures, mergers, and acquisitions could potentially disrupt a 
previously effective internal control system (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007), and as a result, increase the risk of 
noncompliance and costs of compliance. The internal control system must be updated to match the restructured 
business portfolio (Doyle et al. 2007). 
Studies focusing on determinants and consequences of ICMW find that firms with ICMW disclosures tend to be 
smaller, younger, financially weaker, more complex, more active in restructurings, change more rapidly, and have 
more accounting risks (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007). They tend to have more prestigious and 
more independent external auditors, more concentrated ownership, auditing committees that are more 
knowledgeable in accounting and finance, and histories of financial report restatements and auditor resignations 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2007). As this literature review indicates, prior research did not study IT 
related determinants and consequences of ICMW. A few notable exceptions are Li et al (2007), who find that the 
presence of IT expertise in the top management team and audit committee of a firm reduces the likelihood of IT 
control weaknesses; Grant et al (2008), who show that IT control weaknesses have pervasive impact on financial 
reporting; and Canada et al. (2009), who investigate the relationship between IT control weaknesses and audit fees. 
In this paper, we seek to contribute to this nascent, but important literature stream by explaining how “IT” could 
both be the source of the ICMW problem and a potential solution to it. Specifically, we argue that IT disintegration 
challenges entailed in corporate divestitures can create problems by reducing the effectiveness of firms’ IT controls 
and increasing the firms’ risks and costs in SOX compliance. We also posit that superior IT capabilities could 
potentially serve as one solution mechanism by mitigating the negative effects of corporate divestitures on SOX 
compliance risks and costs of firms. 
Constructs and Hypotheses 
IT control effectiveness 
Internal controls are defined as “the policies, procedures, practices and organisational structures designed to 
provide reasonable assurance that business objectives will be achieved and undesired events will be prevented or 
detected and corrected” (ITGI 2007). Modern firms rely heavily on IT applications to support their business 
policies, processes, and practices. Some managerial controls that are designed to mitigate potential risks to the 
achievement of business objectives are automated into the IT applications. We refer to them as IT-enabled or 
automated process controls. For example, a firm can implement the “three-way match” process as an internal control 
mechanism to reduce the risk of paying for goods that are billed by suppliers but not received by the firm. If the firm 
automates its order, shipment, inventory, and payment processes, it can automatically implement the three-way 
match process in its IT systems. In addition, there are potential risks in the underlying IT resources and IT 
management processes of a firm. IT resources and management processes should also be controlled to ensure that 
they perform as intended and deliver the expected functionality with high accountability. Firms implement IT 
general controls to mitigate IT related risks in their IT environments, computer operations, access to IT applications 
and data, application development, and program changes (ITGI 2006). Thus, there are two types of IT controls: (a) 
IT-enabled, automated business controls (IIA 2005); and (b) controls over IT resources and management processes, 
or, IT general controls (ITGI 2006). 
Information Systems Security and Privacy 
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SOX-404 demands the assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting, including 
automated business controls and IT general controls. The effectiveness of the internal controls in the SOX context is 
defined as the extent to which the internal control system can reduce the possibility of material misstatement of 
financial reports of a firm. During a SOX-404 audit, external auditors analyze a firm’s internal controls (IT and non-
IT), financial reporting processes, and map the underlying IT environment that supports the internal controls and 
financially significant processes and accounts. They also test whether the controls are working effectively as 
intended. Based on their auditing standards, independent auditors conclude SOX-404 audits with a decision about 
the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the firm’s internal controls.  
The problem: Why do IT disintegration requirements of corporate divestitures negatively impact IT 
control effectiveness, SOX compliance, and auditor fees of divesting firms? 
In integrating IT systems of units, firms seek to establish linkages among previously distinct and autonomous IT 
resources of the units and make them function as a unified whole (Barki and Pinsonneault 2005; Markus 2000). IT 
disintegration reverses this process. IT disintegration during a divestiture refers to the process of disentangling 
previously unified IT resources of the divested unit from the divesting firm for independent operation. Unified, 
interdependent IT resources of the two businesses are split up into distinctive parts to separately serve the divested 
and divesting businesses. IT resources in the divesting business are adapted and scaled down to match the shrinking 
business requirements (Gartner 2005).  
The risks entailed in IT disintegration during a divestiture depends on the ex ante IT integration status of the 
divesting firm. If IT and business resources of the divested unit were autonomous relative to those of the other 
business units of the seller, the divestiture would entail little or no resource reconfiguration and separation. This is 
rare, however, because most sellers have some degree of cross-business integration and share common IT and 
business resources across their business units. During normal operation, cross-business resource integration is 
desirable for a firm because it creates cross-business synergies in the form of reduced costs and increased revenues 
and improves the overall corporate performance of the firm (Tanriverdi 2005). However, the widely adopted IT 
integration techniques may create barriers for disintegration. IT could be integrated through (1) data warehouse 
which connects IT applications by periodically sharing and exchanging data, (2) ad hoc middleware which connects 
IT applications by translating data flows from one to the other, or (3) a single monolithic software package like ERP 
which provides most of needed functionality (Markus 2000). The first two approaches create complicated 
interdependence between IT resources and thus increase the complexity of the overall IT architecture. The third 
approach assumes that monolithic software like ERP can solve the problems, but it turns out to be just another layer 
of complexity because it still needs to be integrated with peripheral systems or newly acquired systems and it is rigid 
to change (Rettig 2007). Customization of pre-packaged software also creates extra complexity by increasing 
maintenance and upgrade challenges. 
The complexity of integrated IT application architecture introduces significant risks for IT disintegration tasks. 
Banker et al.(1998) found that higher software complexity leads to more project hours of software modification. 
More complex and volatile software codes need more structures in the software codes to decrease such modification 
efforts by localizing changes (Banker and Slaughter 2000). However, it then incurs additional efforts to comprehend 
the structure when the software is modified because maintainers need to trace long chains of interdependence and 
comprehend complicated interfaces (Banker and Slaughter 2000). Changes in one single application will possibly 
influence every other linked application which then complicates the overall change management task (Mookerjee 
2005). Every integration effort may exponentially increase the challenge of future disintegration, as Banker et al. 
(1998) describe in the context of software development: “the key idea is that software development practices have 
long-term consequences that are difficult and costly to reverse.” When the divesting firm has a complex system of 
many IT components that are interacting with each other due to interdependency relationships, a seemingly minor 
glitch triggered by an IT disintegration activity in one part of the system could potentially propagate through the 
entire system, amplify along the way, and lead to a system-level catastrophe, as suggested by the “normal accident 
theory” (Perrow 1999). Different control procedures are recommended for mitigating risks in different phases of an 
IT project (Kirsch 2004). But in each phase IT risk resolutions needed to mitigate IT project risks may not be 
identified correctly or executed effectively due to ambiguous heuristics between risk factors and risk resolutions 
(Lyytinen et al. 1998). Thus, IT disintegration activities during a divestiture could increase the probability of IT 
control failures. For example, in its 10-K filing in 2007, NiSource Inc. disclosed that it experienced IT control 
material weaknesses due to its large scale IT system implementations and business process changes: “many new 
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information technology systems and process changes had an accelerated time-line for completion, which created the 
risk of operational delays, potential errors and control failures which could impact NiSource and its financial 
condition.” 
IT strategies, policies, management practices and IT human resources of a firm have pervasive influence on the 
effectiveness of the firm’s IT controls (ITGI 2006). During a divestiture, disintegration of managerial IT resources 
such as the separation of IT executives, IT human resources, IT strategies, policies and processes of the divesting 
firm and the divested unit could disrupt the effectiveness of the IT controls. In software engineering literature, 
Boehm (1991) lists personnel shortfalls and straining computer science capabilities as two major risk factors in 
software projects. In the accounting literature, Ashbaugh-Skaife and her colleagues (2007) argue that firms 
participating in downsizing usually face internal control risks such as the lack of segregation of duties and 
inadequate staffing and supervision. Prior to the divestiture, managerial IT resources such as the CIO, IT human 
resources, IT strategies, policies and processes are shared and integrated across multiple units of the firm. Some of 
key IT employees of the firm are likely to leave along with the divested unit, and the remaining ones may experience 
a higher turnover rate than usual because of the jobs uncertainty created by the divestiture (Kay and Shelton 2000). 
IT management policies need to be updated to match the new business and IT environment of the divesting firm. 
The adaptation of an established internal control environment in a short transition period is a risky and costly 
initiative (Doyle et al. 2007) which increases the probability of ineffective IT controls. Thus, as the divestiture 
intensity of a firm increases, i.e., the firm disentangles and sells a higher percentage of its overall business portfolio, 
IT controls of the firm will become more likely to decline in effectiveness and experience material weaknesses. In 
SOX-404 audits, the detection of material weaknesses in IT controls of a firm is by definition considered to be a 
failure to comply with the regulation. Thus, we expect increasing divestiture intensity of a firm to reduce the firm’s 
likelihood of compliance with SOX-404 by reducing IT control effectiveness of the firm: 
H1a: Increasing divestiture intensity of a firm reduces the firm’s IT control effectiveness. 
H1b: Increasing divestiture intensity of a firm reduces the firm’s likelihood of compliance with SOX-404. 
Internal control disruptions and weaknesses caused by corporate divestitures are also likely to increase compliance 
costs incurred by the divesting firm during a SOX-404 audit. One major source of SOX compliance costs is due to 
the involvement of independent auditors. Auditor fees include audit fees paid to the independent auditor of the firm 
for the auditing services and the non-audit service fees paid to accounting firms for advisory services. The detection 
of internal control exceptions and deficiencies creates significant additional work for external auditor of the firm and 
increases the audit fees. During financial audits, if an internal control exception is detected, auditors will have to 
increase their substantive testing of financial transactions rather than relying on a simple walkthrough test or tests of 
smaller samples. The presence of an IT control exception implies even more work for auditors because if the 
underlying IT systems are not reliable, business processes that run on them or the financial information generated by 
them are not reliable either. Auditors have to conduct more substantive testing, change their audit program, 
communicate more with managers of the firm, and they have to assess and document the severity of the IT control 
exception (Raghunandan and Rama 2006). As a result, they will charge higher auditor fees. Prior research finds that 
firms with material weakness disclosures pay higher fees to external auditors compared to firms without such 
disclosures (Ettredge et al. 2007; Raghunandan and Rama 2006). Firms with IT control material weaknesses also 
pay higher audit fees (Canada et al. 2009). In this study, we seek to extend these findings by explaining that 
corporate divestitures increase auditor fees by reducing the effectiveness of IT controls. A firm can manage to 
prevent material weaknesses caused in its IT controls by a divestiture, and as a result, it can remain compliant with 
SOX-404 despite the divestiture. However, it is still likely to incur higher auditor fees because divestitures disrupt 
the IT controls, and lead to “deficiencies” or “significant deficiencies,” less severe forms of exceptions in them. 
Thus:  
H1c: Increasing divestiture intensity of a firm increases auditor fees of the firm. 
One potential solution: How do superior IT capabilities mitigate the negative effects of divestitures on 
IT control effectiveness, SOX compliance, and auditor fees of divesting firms? 
We propose superior IT capabilities as one potential solution to the IT disintegration problems caused by corporate 
divestitures. Following prior studies, we define IT capability as the firm’s "ability to mobilize and deploy IT-based 
resources in combination or copresent with other resources and capabilities" (Bharadwaj 2000). IT capabilities are 
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dynamic capabilities that enable firms to develop, add, integrate, and release key IT and business resources over 
time (Wade and Hulland 2004). Thus, they are critical to the successful restructuring of business portfolios. 
IT disintegration in corporate divestitures requires major IT resource reconfiguration and change management 
processes. Sellers must be meticulous about planning how the IT disintegration will unfold, define boundaries of the 
divested business, determine which specific IT systems and processes will be separated from the company and 
transferred to the divested unit. Cross-company IT systems and processes need to be carefully unraveled to ensure 
effective separation (Mankins et al. 2008). Old IT systems and processes will need to be split off, retained, 
terminated, or replaced with new ones to ensure the independent operation of the divesting and divested 
organizations (Gartner 2005). To reconfigure the business processes, all firms needs a basic level of IT capability to 
implement the changes. More pervasive changes will require higher levels of IT capabilities (Broadbent et al. 1999). 
Firms with superior IT capabilities have well-defined, documented, standardized, and repeatable processes for 
managing changes in their IT infrastructures and applications. Hence, they are likely to better address the IT 
disintegration challenges of corporate divestitures and better mitigate the risks and costs associated with them 
compared to firms that lack strong IT capabilities. For example, a firm with superior IT capability has a well-defined 
IT planning and organization process, which can be leveraged in the pre-divestiture due diligence phase of corporate 
divestitures. With a well-defined IT planning and organization process, the firm can plan the IT disintegration 
activities of the divestiture, assess potential risks to the successful implementation of the IT disintegration activities, 
and develop control objectives and control activities for mitigating the risks.  
A superior IT capability can also potentially mitigate the negative effects of divestitures on the firm’s ability to 
comply with SOX-404. IT systems and processes support and complement the business systems and processes. Thus, 
when a superior IT capability addresses challenges and threats posed by IT disintegration activities of a divestiture, 
the improvements in IT control effectiveness will also positively reinforce the effectiveness of overall internal 
controls. For example, if the divestiture disrupts the existing IT controls  and creates vulnerabilities in IT security 
controls, IT access controls, IT change management controls, and segregation of duties in the IT infrastructure, the 
digitized business processes that run on the IT infrastructure will also be vulnerable to malicious activity such as 
hacking, fraud, and manipulation. External hackers or disgruntled employees inside the firm can exploit the IT 
control deficiencies to breach business controls as well and gain unauthorized access to financially significant 
business processes. However, firms with superior IT capabilities are more likely to identify and fix the IT control 
deficiencies. The improvements in IT control effectiveness will positively reinforce the effectiveness of the business 
controls as well. Thus, we expect firms with superior IT capabilities to be more likely to reduce the negative effects 
of divestitures on their IT control effectiveness and ability to comply with SOX-404. 
H2a: A superior IT capability reduces negative effects of divestitures on firm’s IT control effectiveness. 
H2b: A superior IT capability reduces negative effects of divestitures on firm’s SOX-404 compliance. 
In auditing financially significant business processes, external auditors pay close attention to the underlying IT 
infrastructures and applications. If there are security holes in the IT infrastructure or applications supporting the 
business processes, the auditors cannot rely on the data generated by the business processes. Then, instead of 
sampling and testing a subset of the transactions, they may have to examine the entire set of transactions carefully 
because the control deficiencies in the underlying IT systems and applications significantly increase the risk of 
fraudulent transactions. Since external auditors increase their work significantly, the audit fees they charge to the 
firm will also increase. As discussed above, IT disintegration requirements of corporate divestitures will disrupt the 
effectiveness of IT controls and lead to the escalation of the audit fees and non-audit advisory service fees. While 
the escalation of these costs may be inevitable in the context of IT disintegration challenges of corporate 
divestitures, a firm can mitigate the escalation of the costs by developing superior IT capabilities for identifying and 
fixing the identified IT control deficiencies. Firms with weaker IT capabilities have to incur higher audit fees 
because they have to hire the services of external firms and pay advisory fees to remedy the IT control deficiencies 
caused by divestitures. Thus: 
H2c: A superior IT capability reduces the escalation effects of increasing divestiture intensity on auditor 
fees of the firm. 
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Methods 
Sample and data 
Our sampling frame for this study are all firms tracked by Audit Analytics, which maintains a database of 
independent auditors’ annual assessment opinions on the effectiveness of internal controls of publicly traded firms 
that are subject to the SOX regulation. Audit Analytics also track auditor fees. Our timeframe covers November 
2004, the earliest SOX-404 compliance deadline, and December 2008, the latest observation available as of this 
writing. If an independent auditor issues an adverse opinion for internal controls of a firm, the type of internal 
control weakness is reported in the Audit Analytics database. This enables us to capture if a firm had material 
weaknesses in its internal controls, and hence, was incompliant with SOX-404 in a given year. The database also 
reports material weaknesses in IT controls of firms under code #22. Specifically, the database describes code #22 as 
a material weakness arising from an “Information technology, software, security, and access issue.” Thus, we are 
able to use code #22 to identify if IT controls of a firm were effective (=1) or not (=0) in a given year. In our study 
timeframe, a superset of 205 unique firms were incompliant with SOX-404 and they disclosed a total of 276 IT 
control material weaknesses. 
Matching process 
Our purpose is to test whether divestiture intensities and IT capabilities of firms affect their IT control effectiveness, 
SOX-404 compliance, and auditor fees. After identifying the main sample of firms that were incompliant with SOX-
404 and had IT control material weaknesses, we also constructed a matched sample of firms, which exhibited similar 
organizational characteristics, but were compliant with SOX-404 and had effective IT controls. Following Barber 
and Lyon (1996), for each firm in our main sample, which received an ineffective SOX-IT evaluation (=0) at time 
(t), we go back two years in time to (t-2) and search for a control firm, which was in the same industry and had 
similar financial performance with that of the sample firm as of (t-2), but ended up with an effective SOX-IT 
evaluation (=1) at time (t). This approach enables us: (a) to have even dispersion in our dependent variables (e.g., 
about 50% of the combined sample is SOX-IT compliant, whereas the other 50% is incompliant); (b) build a two-
year lag structure between our main independent variable (divestiture intensity) and the dependent variable; and (c) 
test whether the variance in divestiture intensities of the firms within two years of the compliance date (t-2, t) 
explains variance in the firms’ abilities to comply with SOX-IT requirements at time (t). 
We followed the steps suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996) to construct the matched control sample. The 
construction process is summarized in Table 1 below.  
 
First, we started with the main sample of firms which had ineffective SOX-IT control disclosures in the Audit 
Analytics database (276 firm-year observations). Second, we focused on a subset of those firms for which data on 
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one of our matching criteria, i.e., financial performance, was available in Compustat (254 firm-year observations). 
Third, we selected firms whose financial performance was positive (186 firm-year observations). Imposing this 
criterion ensured that firms in our sample divested one of their business units not because of poor previous 
performance of the unit, but because of a strategic intention. Thus, we use a conservative sample of profitable firms 
engaging in corporate portfolio transformations for strategic reasons. Following (Barber and Lyon 1996), we 
measure financial performance by return on assets (ROA) and compute it as operating income (Compustat Item 
OIBDP) divided by the average of beginning- and end-of-period total assets (Compustat Item AT). Fourth, we focus 
on a subset of the candidate control firms in the Audit Analytics database that were operating in the same SIC 
industry as the sample firm in year (t-2) and achieved SOX-IT compliance in year (t). The industry match controls 
for cross-sectional variations in operating performance that arise from industry. Following Barber and Lyon (1996), 
we try to identify a firm whose performance was within 90% to 110% range and closest to that of the sample firm’s 
ROA at year t-2 in the firm’s 4-digit SIC industry. For the remaining unmatched firms, we check if we can find a 
match in the same 3-digit SIC, or 2-digit SIC, or 1-digit SIC. For the firms that still remain unmatched, we follow 
Baber and Lyon’s (1996) suggestion to expand the performance range to 70% to 130% of the sample firm’s ROA. 
We have to drop three firms because we cannot find a match for them despite the steps above. We checked if any 
control firms happened to be in our main sample. We identified 10 such firms and replaced them with the second 
closest match. Finally, we replaced one more matched firm, which was selected as a match to multiple firms in the 
main sample. We performed independent t-tests to compare differences between the sample and the matched control 
firm characteristics. The two groups are not significantly different along our matching criteria, the ROA (t=.092, 
p>0.1). This indicates that the matching process worked as intended. After collecting data on all study variables and 
missing some more observations due to missing data, we were able to retain for hypothesis testing a sample size 
ranging from 228 to 293 dependent on different models. 
Dependent Variables 
IT control effectiveness. As noted above, we measure IT control effectiveness of a firm by code #22 in the Audit 
Analytics database. While this dummy variable may appear simplistic, external auditor of a firm conducts 
independent assessments of hundreds of IT controls of the firm before concluding if the overall IT controls of the 
firm are effective (=1) or not (=0). This assessment is disclosed to regulators and the investing public. Thus, it is the 
most comprehensive and objective measure of a firm’s IT control effectiveness that is publicly available. In some 
cases, a firm’s SOX-404 report is restated multiple times in a year (observed in 4.6% of the sample). In such cases, 
we use the latest audited results. 
SOX-404 Compliance. We perform the matching work based on IT control weakness, and by definition all the 
observations in the IT control weakness group are incompliant. In the control group, 15 firms are also incompliant 
with SOX-404 due to non-IT control weaknesses. To test if IT disintegration challenges of divestitures affect SOX-
404 compliance as hypothesized, we include a firm’s SOX-404 compliance (1=compliant) as our second dependent 
variable. We measure it with independent auditor’s assessment of the firm’s internal control over financial reporting 
as publicly disclosed in SEC annual filings and recorded in the Audit Analytics database. 
Auditor fees. Our third dependent variable of interest for assessing the problems created by IT disintegration 
challenges of divestitures is the amount of auditor fees (audit fees plus non-audit advisory fees) paid by the divesting 
firm. We obtain auditor fee data from the Audit Analytics database and compute the logarithm of total auditor fees 
paid to auditors within two years of the SOX-IT control disclosure date (t-2,t). 
Explanatory Variables 
Divestiture intensity. We measure divestiture intensity as the percentage of the firm’s total business portfolio that is 
divested within two years of the SOX-IT control disclosure date. Transaction values of all selected divestitures of 
the firm in the past two years (t-2, t) are summed and then divided by the market capitalization of the firm at the end 
of year (t-2). Since the sizes of divested units vary greatly relative of the size of the seller, to ensure that we focus on 
significant divestitures, we select only those whose individual transaction volumes are larger than 10% of the firms’ 
market capitalization, or when a series of divestitures within the two year time window jointly account for more than 
10% of the firms’ market capitalization. We collect data on divestiture activity of firms from the SDC Platinum 
database and year-end market capitalization data from CompuStat database. 
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IT capability. We use objective, publicly available measures of firms’ IT capabilities as assessed by the Information 
Week (IW) magazine. In creating its annual list of IW500 firms, IW asks a panel of IW experts and industry peers of 
candidate firms whether IT capabilities of the candidate firms are above-average in their respective industries in 
terms of their patterns of technological, procedural, and organizational innovation. If a firm is selected into the 
IW500 list, it is considered to have superior IT capabilities relative to its industry peers. This measure of IT 
capability has been used in prior IS studies (e.g., Bharadwaj 2000; Radhakrishnan et al. 2008; Sabherwal and 
Sabherwal 2005; Santhanam and Hartono 2003). We consider a firm in our sample as having a superior IT capability 
if it appears in the IW500 list in the five-year time window prior to the firm’s SOX disclosure date. 
Control Variables 
Industry-adjusted sales growth. Rapidly growing firms may fail to timely update their internal controls and 
encounter staffing issues. Newly established procedures in rapidly growing firms are also more likely to have 
deficiencies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007). Thus, we control for sales growth of firms and 
compute it by sales (CompuStat Item SALE) growth of firm at year (t-2) minus average sales growth of the firm's 
industry in the same period. 
Firm size. Large firms are likely to have more resources to invest on their internal controls and hire adequate 
number of employees to ensure proper segregation of duties (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007). Thus, 
we control for size of firms and operationalize it as the logarithm of firm’s market capitalization. Our results are 
robust to alternative size measures such as logarithm of number of employees or logarithm of total assets. 
Foreign operation. Firms that have foreign operations face different institutional and legal environments and have 
more complex transactions. Following prior studies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007), we control for 
foreign operations of firms by including a dummy variable taking on a value of [1] when a firm has a foreign 
currency adjustment in its financial statement, [0] otherwise. 
Inventory level. Prior studies on internal control effectiveness also control for firm’s relative level of inventory to 
capture accounting measurement application risks (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007; Ogneva et al. 2007). Firms with 
more inventories face more risks related to inventory measurement, recording, reporting and valuation (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2007). Thus, we control for inventory level by computing the ratio of [inventory (Compustat Item 
INVT)] / [Total assets (Compustat Item AT)]. 
IT intensity. Firms operate in different industrial environments having different levels of IT intensity. In IT-
intensive environments, firms may have more exposures to IT risks and their divestitures may require more IT 
disintegration activity. Thus, we control for IT intensity of firms. First we compute IT intensities of the industry 
segments in which a firm participates. IT intensity of an industry segment is measured as the ratio of the software 
and hardware stock value over the total equipment stock value in the segment (Brynjolfsson et al. 1994). Data on IT 
and other equipment stock is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Then, we compute a firm 
level IT intensity measure by using the firm’s percentage of sales generated from a segment as weight and 
computing a sales weighted average of IT intensities of all industry segments in which the firm operates. Data on 
sales distributions of firms across segments is obtained from Compustat’s segment database. 
Diversification level. Diversified firms may face more challenges in maintaining effective IT controls due to their 
heterogeneous IT environments. In addition, they tend to restructure their business portfolios more frequently. To 
account for these effects, we control for the diversification level of firms in our sample. We adopt the entropy 








∑ , where iP  is the share 
of the i th segment of the firm in the total sales of the firm. The data for this measure is obtained from Compustat’s 
segment database. 
M&A intensity. Firms may divest businesses as a consequence of previous mergers or acquisitions (Bergh 1997; 
Shimizu and Hitt 2005). Post acquisition integration could also introduce internal control weaknesses (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2007; Doyle et al. 2007). To account for the effects of M&A, we control for M&A intensity and 
compute it as the summed M&A transaction volumes of a firm in the past three years divided by the firm’s market 
capitalization in the SOX-IT control disclosure year. The three-year time window is one year longer than the two-
year window used for divestitures. This allows us to capture if the divestitures of interest in our sample were due to 
earlier M&A activity of the firm. Data on M&A transactions of firms is obtained from the SDC Platinum database. 
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Unless stated otherwise, we measure all control variables two years before the dependent variables to account for 




Because we adopted a matched control sample technique and two of our dependent variables are binary variables, a 
conditional Logit model is appropriate to capture the matching structure within the sample. Under conditional Logit 









+ −i1 i0x x β
  
where 
1ix and 0ix  are row vectors consisting of all the explanatory variables for the sample and the control firms in 
i th matched pair, I is the total number of pairs, and β  is a column vector of corresponding coefficients to be 
estimated. Compared to the regular Logit, a conditional Logit model calculates the likelihood of the binary outcomes 
conditional on each matched pair. This estimation method is widely used by biostatisticians and epidemiologists to 
perform case-control studies (Breslow 1982; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2004), and also adopted in accounting research 
(Cram et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2007). We use robust standard errors clustering on firms and their pairs to allow 
interdependence of observations between them (Stata 2007).  
For our third dependent variable, auditor fees, we use OLS regression with the same robust standard error structure. 
Multicollinearity tests on these linear models show that the VIFs in all the OLS models are below 3, which is far 
below the suggested threshold 10. The results on each of the three dependent variables are presented respectively in 
panels A, B, and C of Table 2. In each panel, the first model enters the control variables. The second model enters 
the main effect of divestiture intensity. Finally, the third model enters the moderation effect of IT capability.  
Results 
Table 3 below summarizes the statistical results. Divestiture intensity of a firm has negative and significant impacts 
on IT control effectiveness (Panel A, second model) and SOX-404 compliance of the firm (Panel B, second model). 
It also increases auditor fees (Panel C, second model). Thus, H1a, H1b, and H1c are supported. 
IT capability moderates the relationships between (1) divestiture intensity and IT control effectiveness (Panel A, 
third model); (2) divestiture intensity and SOX-404 compliance of the firm (Panel B, third model); and (3) 
divestiture intensity and auditor fees of the firm (Panel C, third model). Thus, H2a, H2b, and H2c are also supported. 
The overall model statistics are significant as indicated by the Likelihood Ratio test statistics for conditional Logit 
models and model F statistics for OLS regressions. 
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Discussions and Conclusions 
In this research, we identify an important phenomenon that is understudied by IS research: IT disintegration 
challenges entailed in corporate divestitures. We argue that these challenges create significant risks and costs for the 
divesting firm. In our empirical study, we choose to examine a subset of those risks and costs in the context of 
another understudied phenomenon, namely, SOX-404 compliance. Our findings provide support for the proposed 
theory. IT disintegration challenges entailed in corporate divestitures of a firm reduce the effectiveness of both IT 
and non-IT internal controls of the firm. They also significantly increase the firm’s compliance costs, as captured by 
external audit fees and non-audit advisory service fees incurred by the firm during its SOX-404 compliance efforts. 
In addition to identifying divestitures as a major problem increasing regulatory compliance risks and costs of firms, 
we identify a potential solution mechanism. Our results on the moderating effect of IT capability indicate that a 
superior IT capability significantly mitigates the negative effects of divestitures on internal control effectiveness, 
SOX-404 compliance, and auditor fees. Interestingly, the main effects of IT capability on our dependent variables 
are not significant. This is an interesting finding for IS research since we tend to assume that IT capabilities are 
universally valuable. In our study, a superior IT capability does not prevent the regulatory compliance risks or costs 
associated with IT control disruptions caused by corporate divestitures. But, it does reduce their negative effects.  
We contribute to IT security research by linking a strategic move such as corporate divestitures to IT control 
effectiveness of a firm such as security and access controls, change management controls, controls over computer 
operations, application development, and so forth. The implication of our findings for IT security research and 
practice is that no matter how strong a firm’s existing security controls and security management capabilities may 
be, major organizational changes such as corporate divestitures, which entail significant IT disintegration, will 
disrupt them and increase the firm’s compliance risks and costs. However, firms that maintain superior security 
management capabilities are likely to address and remedy those disruptions more effectively and reduce the negative 
effects. 
Our findings are also important for accounting studies on internal control effectiveness and regulatory compliance. 
While the accounting research is very much interested in documenting antecedents and consequences of internal 
control effectiveness, it has not yet identified solution mechanisms for the antecedents that negatively impact 
internal control effectiveness of firms. Our theory and findings suggest that superior IT capabilities could potentially 
serve as a viable solution mechanism. 
Prior studies recognize that corporate restructuring activities negatively affect internal control effectiveness of firms. 
However, they focus almost exclusively on mergers and acquisitions and overlook the potential impacts of corporate 
divestitures. In this study, we sought to introduce corporate divestitures as an additional factor impacting the 
effectiveness of internal controls, and in particular, the effectiveness of IT controls of firms. In doing so, we 
followed prior studies and controlled for the effects of M&A intensity of firms as well. Interestingly, our findings on 
this control variable indicate that M&A intensity does not have any significant effects on internal control 
effectiveness (IT or non-IT) or auditor fees. Since M&A transactions emphasize IT integration, our findings suggest 
that the IT disintegration challenges faced in corporate divestitures could be much more consequential for internal 
control effectiveness and regulatory compliance risks and costs of firms than the IT integration challenges faced in 
mergers and acquisitions. 
Some of our measures are subject to the limitations of archival data. For example, we use the presence or absence of 
a firm on the IW500 list as an indicator of the firm’s superior IT capability or lack thereof. Although this is a widely 
used measure of IT capability in IS research, it does not provide us detailed insights about the types of IT 
capabilities divesting firms may be using to address the disruptions caused in their IT controls by a divestiture. 
Similarly, we use auditor’s assessment of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of IT controls. While auditors go over 
hundreds of IT controls to make that assessment, they only report material weaknesses, the most severe form of 
control exception. They do not report less severe forms of control exceptions such as deficiencies or significant 
deficiencies. Future studies using survey methodology or qualitative methodologies can generate deeper insights 
about the constructs and nomological relationships examined in this study. 
Notwithstanding the data limitations, our theory and preliminary findings in the context of regulatory compliance 
suggest that IT disintegration is an important topic that is worthy of further research attention. We hope that our 
study will spark interest in further research on antecedents and consequences of IT disintegration in corporate 
divestitures, strategic alliances, inter-firm relationships, outsourcing and offshoring arrangements, and internal 
business portfolio restructuring efforts of firms. 
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